What are the variables that determine an organization's structure? Are they strategy, size, environment, or a combination of all these and some more? Researchers seem to be unsure about answers to these questions as a bewildering array of factors are brought into focus.
Studies on Organization Structure
For Chandler (1966) and Drucker (1974) , among others, structure is determined by the organization's goals and strategies. According to Drucker (1974) , "structure is a means for attaining the objectives and goals of an institution. Any work on structure must therefore start with objectives and strategies. " (pp 523-524) Chandler, endorsing the views of Drucker, states that "structure follows strategy. " (p 13)
But it is not strategies or goals alone that determine the organization structure. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) , for example, found that structure is determined by the environment. Woodward (1965) and Perrow (1967) , on the other hand, stress that technology determines the structure.
Studies based on public sector organizations in developing countries point to a different set of variables as determinants of the structure. According to Murthy (1985) :
"In private enterprises, the strategic management is primarily economic in nature and adjusts incrementally to socio-political processes. In public enterprises the sequence is reversed. Strategic management begins with socio-political values and incrementally integrates the economic aspects ." (p 382) Aharoni (1986) endorses Murthy's views : "... state-owned enterprises' goal are independent variables that stem from the contest for power of individuals in a political arena, not dependent variables, being the instrument of one or more groups that impose goals on it. The organizations' goals can (only) be inferred from the actions of organizations. " (p 133) Most of the studies probing the variables that determine organization structure have been done on large private sector organizations in developed countries. Studies that have used public sector organizations in developing countries to study factors determining the organization's structure are rare.
This paper attempts to fill in this lacuna. An enterprise owned by the state of Andhra Pradesh in India (a developing country) -the Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation (APIDC)-has been used to study the structure in public sector enterprises.
In this paper, available data on APIDC have been analysed to determine the factors which influence its organization structure, its evolution, and its performance against the stated objectives. On the basis of this analysis, the following questions are attempted to be answered to approach a conclusive solution:
• What is the basis for APIDC's present struc ture and strategy? • Why has it so evolved? • What were the strategic objectives sought to be achieved in earlier organization design at tempts? • What can be the performance oriented strategy and structure for APIDC ?
Objectives of APIDC
APIDC was incorporated in 1960 as a wholly owned company of the Government of Andhra Pradesh to promote industrial development in the state. Its main objectives are:
• to promote large and medium scale industries in the state • to bridge the regional imbalance by rational transfer of resources • to develop entrepreneurship among the people of the state • to create employment opportunities through industrialization of the state. The activities of the Corporation are formally stated to" be as under:
• entrepreneurial guidance from the concept stage up to the commissioning of the unit • identifying viable projects and applying for letters of intent and registrations with govern ment authorities 
Organization Structure in APIDC
APIDC is headed by a non-executive chairman whose role is to chair the meetings of the Board of Directors. The chief executive is the vice-chairman and managing director. The organization structure is given in Figure 1 .
There have been some attempts at restructuring. One was the invitation to a team of consultants to suggest an alternative organization structure in 1983-84 by the then vice-chairman.
With the given organization structure, it was difficult to assign responsibility for performance or lack of it. Though, on paper, the vice-chairman was responsible for the overall performance of the Corporation, accountability could not be ensured as only officers on deputation used to man this post. Based on this analysis, the consultants suggested an alternative organization structure (see Figure 2) . In 1984-85, the then vice-chairman made some changes in the organization structure before implementing the structure suggested by the consultants (see Figure 3) .
Institution of Executive Director
In the organization structure at the time of initiation of the consultancy study (Figure 4) , and the one suggested by the consultants (Figure 2 ), the executive director theoretically occupies a key role.
The institution of executive director has its origin in the promotion of a state government officer who was deputed as GM (Operations) in 1980. When the GM (Operations) was promoted in his parent service in 1982, his position was redesignated as executive director without any changes in his task and responsibilities, presumably to emphasize the higher status of the deputationist officer. In 1986, the Board of APIDC made a provision for two executive directors, one to be deputed from the government and the second to be promoted from amongst the general managers of the Corporation. The then GM (Projects) was promoted to this post -the first employee to be so promoted.
We can, perhaps, surmise that this new position was created to accommodate the career aspirations of managers employed by APIDC. However, its precise role was left undefined.
Performance
The merits of particular strategies and organization structure can be judged only against performance. It would be instructive to note the performance of APIDC in this context. The performance norms of industrial development corporations such as APIDC are (United Nations, 1974):
• number of industrial units set up by the Corporation by its own efforts • performance of such industrial units • effectiveness of the organization in monitor ing the performance of industrial units • effectiveness in maintaining balanced regi onal development of the state • alertness in preventing undesirable be neficiaries from cornering its promotional benefits. Keeping these in perspective, APIDC's performance is evaluated here.
Promotion of Industrial Units
APIDC promotes industrial units through:
• Establishing (viable) industrial units as its subsidiaries, where APIDC's shareholding is 100 per cent.
• Starting up joint ventures with entre preneurs, where the entrepreneurs' holdings are 2 6 per cent. APIDC's shareholding ranges from 25 per cent to 50 per cent, the rest being offered to public. There is a possibility of dis investment of APIDC's shareholding when the unit is handed over to the entrepreneur. • Share capital assistance (10 per cent to 15 per cent) to industrial units.
• Term loans, seed capital, and refinancing (under a national financial institution's scheme) facilities. However, APIDC's claim of promoting 494 units cannot be taken at its face value. Only in the case of joint ventures and subsidiaries can such a claim be justified. In the case of 'assisted units,' it is difficult to measure the promotional efforts of APIDC as they have been set up mainly through the efforts of individual entrepreneurs. By merely lending some financial assistance, APIDC cannot claim to play a promotional role. As can be seen above, 80 per cent of the units fall in this category. We may, therefore, hypothesize that APIDC has mainly played a passive role in promoting industrial units, by directing financial resources to individual entrepreneurs.
The wide range of industries covered by APIDC's assistance adds weight to this hypothesis. It would be impossible for any single organization to undertake an active entrepreneurial role across such a variety of industries.
Narrowing Regional Imbalances
The state of Andhra Pradesh comprising 23 districts can be divided into three regions: A, B, and C. Region A consists of nine districts, Region B four districts, and Region C ten districts. The state capital is in one of the ten districts of Region C.
According to India's industrial policy, selected districts (which are classified as backward) in each state are eligible for a package of incentives for promoting industrialization. Some of these districts also happen to be adjacent to metropolitan cities which are already developed. Entrepreneurs usually concentrate their industrial units in the suburbs and the adjoining areas of already industrially developed cities by taking advantage of loopholes in the government's definition of a backward area. The same case holds true for Andhra Pradesh. Industrial activity in the state has been confined to the suburbs/adjoining areas of two metropolitan cities in Region A, one city in Region B, and one city in Region C (which is the state capital). Of APIDC's 66 joint ventures, 36 are in Region C, 17 in Region A, and 13 in Region B.
Of the 349 assisted units, 185 are in Region C, 111 in Region A, and 53 in Region B. The figures reveal a bias towards Region C and a neglect of Region B. Hence we may infer that APIDC has not been successful in dispersing industries across regions.
Monitoring Performance
APIDC does not appear to possess adequate machinery to monitor the performance of units supported by it. This can be seen from the fact that a single manager is allotted this charge, along with the rehabilitation function. Thus, the manager does not appear to be in a position to concentrate on either of the two activities, given the complexity of both functions.
APIDC nominates its managers (including deputy managers) on the boards of sponsored and assisted units. This nominee director system, however, has not been successful in monitoring performance. This is reflected by the fact that neither the government nor APIDC has authentic data on the number of sick units in the state. APIDC admits that 33 sick units can be sold though the total number of sick units is not yet identified. Of these 33 sick units, 15 are joint ventures. That APIDC could not prevent sickness in its own joint ventures is an indicator of its weakness in monitoring performance.
Profitability of APIDC
The following are figures of net profit earned by APIDC from 1980-81 to 1986-87:
The data indicate that APIDC has been able to report book profits consistently. It can be seen that there has been a sudden downturn in the last two (Rs in lakh) years. However, book profits do not reflect performance of units aided by APIDC, as also performance in areas like bridging regional disparities, promoting entrepreneurship, etc.
Financial Management
APIDC, to this day, depends on finance from the state government and national financial institutions for its activities ( 70 per cent in 1986-87). Considering that it was established 28 years ago, this is not a desirable position, more so when so many innovations are possible for raising finance from the capital market. APIDC is already facing a resource crunch. As can be seen from Table 1 , the resource gap is expected to grow over the coming years to 20 per cent of expected outlays in 1989-90. APIDC does not appear to be facing up to the magnitude of the problem of raising resources to fund industrialization in the state. This is reflected in the low priority given to the finance function in the organization; the post of GM (Finance) is vacant, despite the approaching financial crisis.
Criticism from the Press
Towards the end of 1987, many allegations were made in the press about preferential treatment given by APIDC to industrial units started by politicians of different parties and their kith and kin. The allegations have been continuing in the media since then. In addition, there have been other allegations that APIDC has favoured big business in allotment of subsidies and other incentives. APIDC does not appear to have responded to these allegations. The small/would be entrepreneur is the usual sufferer in this process-the very group APIDC is expected to develop. We may, hence, conclude that there is a lot of room for improvement in the implementation of the stated objectives of APIDC.
Present Strategy and Structure
APIDC was established with the specific purpose of industrializing the state of Andhra Pradesh. Industrialization is a socio-economic process, where decision making has to take into account political factors. The government would have its own priorities which would seem an imposition for APIDC; for instance, the objective of generating employment. Thus, APIDC would be expected to perform some of the functions of the government in addition to the purposes for which it was set up. It would be difficult for APIDC to specify its objectives with a strict per-dents have awarded first rank to the goal of "achieving growth in the present activities of APIDC" and 32 per cent of the respondents have awarded first rank to the goal of "realizing government's directives." It can thus be seen that "strategy," as has been understood by APIDC managers, has meant a simple addition of industries to its list of assisted unitswhich would probably be seen to be in keeping with government policy. From its inception till 1985-86, APIDC has primarily emphasized providing financial assistance to industrial units and secondarily establishing subsidiaries/joint ventures. APIDC's structure appears to have evolved to carry out these espoused and pursued objectives.
Probable Reasons for Present Strategy and Structure
Some clues to the evolution of the present structure can be found in Robbing (1983) :
No more than fifty to sixty per cent of the variability in structure can be explained by strategy, size, technology, and environment. The remainder can be attributed to organizational politics; more specifically to the power control view of structure which states that an organization's structure is the result of a power struggle by internal constituencies who are seeking to further their political interests, (pp 184-185) This power struggle will perhaps be more in public enterprises owing to their creation by political party governments. Thus, the probable reasons for APIDC's structure may be better explained by the assumptions of the power control school on organization structure. One main difference between the power control school and other schools is that the latter assume rationality in decision making which is by and large associated with performance orientation in economic terms. The power control school' states that power in political terms is the central theme in decision making. The objectives of a dominant coalition in an organization set the objectives and influence the structure of the organization. This is what appears to have happened in APIDC.
Since inception, APIDC's board of directors appears to have been dominated by public men and industrialists. Excepting one or two directors nominated by a central financial institution, the rest of the directors, including the chairman, are nominated by the state government. The managing director has always belonged to the state government. Till 1983, the role of the chairman had been confined to presiding over board meetings. In 1984, the state government made a policy change and declared the role of the chairman to be supervisory. To make this step effective, the government changed the composition of the board so that at least 50 per cent of the directors would be non-officials. The short tenure of the managing director has also contributed to the increasing political clout of non-official directors, all of whom are nominated by the state government.
Such conditions create a fertile ground for dominant coalitions to assert their power. A dominant coalition may be defined to be one which has power to affect the structure. Any coalition which can control the allocation of scarce and important resources and reduce organizational uncertainties can become dominant. In APIDC, the dominant coalition would be the one which can influence the allocation of financial resources from the state government and central financial institutions to the Corporation, and from the Corporation to individual entrepreneurs.
With the central financial institutions presumably playing a neutral role, the state government has an important say in decision making in APIDC. This is seen in the continuing imposition of state government officers on APIDC. The government, in turn, seems to have gradually transferred its power to the public men/industrialists, as can be inferred from the changes in the board's composition, the increase in the number of non-official directors, and the transfer of supervisory powers to the chairman. Thus, the group has acquired a mediatory role between the financing institutions and APIDC. Their association with entrepreneurs, would-be industrialists, and other business interest groups (i.e. the beneficiaries of APIDC activities) should also enable them to mediate the transfer of resources from APIDC to industrial units. The performance of APIDC appears to be measured solely by the number of industrial units financed. It is hence a simple task for the dominant coalition to show achievement-to both the state government and business interests.
If the above postulates are reasonable, it can be hypothesized that the corporate structure of APIDC has evolved to meet the strategic interests of its dominant coalition. The importance assigned to particular functions in APIDC appears to substantiate this hypothesis.
The appraisal and follow-up division has not been created, despite a provision to this effect in the organization (see Figure 4) . Moreover, the suggestion of the consultants to create a rehabilitation and monitoring division (Figure 2) has not elicited favourable response. In spite of the financial position of APDDC becoming weak and the monitoring and follow-up functions becoming inevitable, APIDC has dithered in the creation of the division. The responsibility has instead been handed over to the newly created regional offices. Not being in a position to exclusively supervise this function (being also responsible for ongoing activities), the regional offices would probably continue to accord a low priority to monitoring and follow-up. This low weightage would be in the strategic interests of the present dominant coalition.
Another example of structure evolving to meet the political strategy of the dominant coalition is provided by the low importance assigned to the finance function in the organization. In spite of the growing importance of this function (which includes monitoring financial performance, collection of dues, preventing industrial sickness, and attracting resources from capital markets), it serves no immediate material interest of the dominant coalition.
A conceptual framework developed to explain this phenomenon is provided by Murthy (1985) . He puts forward a three-stage model to explain evolution of strategy and structure in public enterprises. According to him, a public enterprise faces the problem of managing the balance between the value (political) and economic (performance) aspects of its strategy as soon as it comes into existence. This is Stage 1 where "the value and economic aspects of strategy are out of balance." In this stage, the enterprise needs the cooperation and support of the government "to insulate the enterprise from premature attacks based on values other than the ones that were responsible for the creation of the enterprise. The managers have to take initiative in synthesizing concrete action for integrating the external values into the specific tasks of the enterprise." This calls for professionalism and leadership skills on the part of public enterprise managers. The completion of Stage 1 would be a milestone in the evolution of an enterprise. According to Murthy, it took 20 years for BHEL to complete the first stage in a complex technological environment. HMT took just ten years in view of the early response and involvement of external strategic forces and the professional dynamism of its CEOs and managers (p 382). t APIDC, it appears, is still in the initial years of Stage 1. It is pursuing the value laden objective of increasing the number of assisted units, and ignoring performance aspects like monitoring, narrowing regional disparities, promoting entrepreneurship, and identifying/sponsoring employment generating industries. The involvement of the state government and other external groups (public men/industrialists) can be seen as buffering mechanisms to 'insulate APIDC from premature attacks. A successiul resolution of this stage would result in APIDC moving to the second stage of balancing the economic and value aspects of its strategies, and thence to the third stage of institutionalizing its ends and means. It needs to be noted, however, that a smooth transition across the three stages hinges on the "cooperation and team work of the three key actors, viz. managers, bureaucrats, and politicians". (Murthy, 1987) 
Attempts at Organization Structure Design
An analysis of attempts to design the organization structure could provide some interesting insights.
The consultants suggested a structure in 1983-84 ( Figure 2 ) with three divisions: finance, rehabilitation and monitoring, and projects and operations. This is a functional structure with seemingly equal emphasis being accorded to the three functions. As noted earlier, owing to the strategic compulsions of the dominant coalition of public men/industrialists, these recommendations were never fully implemented. The role ambiguity of the executive director was sought to be clarified by allotting him the tasks of HRD and general administration. This is clearly a staff function. When viewed in the light of the functions allocated to the general managers, which are line jobs, one sees an attempt to shunt out the executive director from policy decision making. Interestingly, civil construction has been clubbed with the rehabilitation and monitoring division while it should logically be the purview of the projects and operations division, it may be surmised that the design was carried out to balance various interests, rather than being based on rigid performance criteria. This lends credence to the hypothesis made earlier that strategy and structure at APIDC has evolved to meet the value (political) objectives of a dominant coalition.
The structural changes introduced by the vicechairman in 1986-88 (Figure 2) give the impression of ad hoc measures undertaken to meet an approaching financial crisis. The creation of regional offices could be viewed to be an attempt to decentralize these functions. However, with decision making con-tinuing to be highly centralized, the effectiveness of these changes is doubtful. The post of the CM (Finance) post continues to remain vacant which seems to indicate the continued low priority assigned to this function. It is interesting to note the continued role ambiguity of the executive director. Here again, changes in the organization structure appear to have been carried out in the value (political) interests of the dominant coalition -specifically to create an image of attempting to solve long-standing issues of financial policy. However, in the absence of substantial changes in orientation (say, vigorous follow-up of disinvestment policies or even appointment of a GM (Finance), apart from raising funds in the capital market), these changes are bound to remain cosmetic. One can see again the hand of a dominant coalition in determining the strategies and structure of APIDC.
Performance Oriented Strategy and Structure
APIDC appears to be still in the initial phase of Stage 1. It is yet to attempt balancing its value and economic aspects of strategy. It would, however, be instructive to note the outline of a performance oriented strategy to gain an understanding of how APIDC would evolve.
APIDC could be viewed to be a development corporation. In its 28 years of existence, APIDC appears to have assigned itself the role of mediating the transfer of resources from the state government and central financial institutions to industrial units. As a development corporation, it has responsibility and accountability for the resources transferred to various units. The long term survival of APIDC may hence depend on its ability to manage these resources productively.
Productive management of resources requires monitoring performance of aided units, follow-up action in collection of dues, periodic disinvestments, rehabilitation of sick units, and innovations in raising additional resources. Performance oriented strategies would probably develop to implement such goals.
Strategically, the finance function is vital for APIDC's performance oriented goals. Skills in assessing viability of projects and capability of promoters is also important. Regional balance in industrial development is, in the final analysis, a function of entrepreneurial capabilities of the people of a particular region. APIDC may need to move actively into this area by treating it as a high-priority HRD function. It would also heighten the importance of technical and management consultancy provided by APIDC. APIDC would have to develop expertise in these areas. Ultimately, a structure would evolve which would suitably integrate the above mentioned areas. A smooth transition across the three stages of growth of a public enterprise appears, however, mandatory before these projections have a possibility of becoming real.
Conclusion
In conclusion, drawing on Murthy's three stage model, it can be said that APIDC is still in Stage 1 of organizational evolution. This is characterized by an imbalance between the value (political) and performance (economic) aspects of its strategy. It is still to insulate itself from values other than those that were responsible for its creation. APIDC is attempting to integrate external strategic forces (bureaucracy and political system) in its strategic decision making.
Till such time this is done, the organization structure will continue to subserve the value (political) objectives of the dominant coalition (public men/industrialists) of APIDC.
